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THE DEATH PENALTY: WHERE ARE WE NOW?
ROBERT BLECKER*
When an international network hating America and the West
sends suicide bombers to kill our innocent civilians by the thousands,
confident that dying along with their victims lands them in heaven,
death-as-deterrence and death-as-deserved takes on new meaning.
Conventional wisdom tells us that post September 11th nothing shall
ever be the same. But we must avoid the post hoc: Where we are after 9/
11 is not necessarily where we are because of that day.
The new millennium began on January 31, 2000, when conserva-
tive Republican Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium in Illi-
nois, after a journalism class at Northwestern uncovered the innocence
of Anthony Porter, a man about to be put to death. Executing Carla
Fay Tucker in 1998 had given the Nation the willies, arousing a storm
of protest at killing a beautiful woman who had found Christ. Under-
mined by the Columbia study which showed that 68% of death penal-
ties were reversed for serious error, spurred on by media which played
up the occasional horror story of a sleeping lawyer and cast serious
doubt on the guilt of some convicted murderers condemned to die,
support for the death penalty dropped.
As its blood price for membership in the economic club, Europe
kept on demanding all members abolish capital punishment. Still in
the U.S. death rows swelled, and a fairly steady pace of executions
climbed and hovered at nearly eighty a year—while Texas Governor
George W. Bush, whose state led the nation in executions, was elected
forty-third President of the United States.
That year, in Apprendi, a bitterly divided U.S. Supreme Court held
that New Jersey could not make the defendant’s racially based motive a
“sentencing factor” that increased the punishment for assault, to be
decided only by a judge’s best guess.1 The Court 5-4 explicitly held that
any fact which can increase the maximum possible punishment must
be specified in an indictment, and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Tufts, B.A. 1969; Harvard, J.D. 1974.
Harvard Fellow in Law and Humanities, 1976-77. Served as Special Assistant Attorney
General, New York State Office of Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor.
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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doubt. Acknowledging that several state legislatures gave judges ulti-
mate authority to decide life or death, the Justices left the special world
of death penalty jurisprudence for another day.
By 2001, the movement for a moratorium had grown, as the Phila-
delphia City Council and other municipalities passed resolutions urg-
ing their state legislatures to put a halt to the death penalty until it
could be reviewed and revised. Maryland joined Illinois and halted all
executions, pending further study and reform. It felt like the late 1960s
again, in the years before Furman,2 as doubts spread about whether
those who were being executed deserved it or were even guilty. Then
Timothy McVeigh was executed with the support of more than 80% of
the American people—among them many who generally opposed cap-
ital punishment but were willing to make an exception for this mass
murdering terrorist who had callously characterized the deaths of
nineteen children in day care as “collateral damage”. Waiting for the
public outrage to fade with the next problematic execution, abolition-
ists now prepared to employ a new moral benchmark against which
other condemned killers would be measured: “Not as bad as McVeigh.”
Then September 11.
It seemed strange as we fought the war in Afghanistan against Al
Qaeda and the Taliban—religiously fanatic mass murderers targeting
not only our civilians but our entire civilization—that the instant we
captured those who would incinerate us by chemical waste or waste this
nation by pandemic, some of us seemed more concerned with their
civil liberties than our own survival. Others insisted on our moral and
legal right to kill them. Now that the Taliban are gone and Al Qaeda
dispersed but potentially more dangerous, now that we have cleared
out the ruins of the World Trade Center and returned to regular gov-
ernment, where are we in the aftermath?
In June, 2002, twice within one week, the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down major decisions restricting the death penalty. In Atkins,
over a bitter dissent, the majority categorically forbade states from exe-
cuting the mentally retarded but left it up to the states to determine
who in fact was retarded. With a measured IQ of fifty-nine, Atkins, the
condemned killer, had been classified as “mildly retarded”: His ac-
count of the robbery murder, however, was sustained and coherent,
although the jury rejected it. He gave his recipe for chicken, could
make change, knew that “Kennedy” had recently died in a plane crash
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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and was the “son of JFK, President” of the United States. When asked
about pi, he replied “3.15”, and used “deja vu” and “orchestra” cor-
rectly in conversation.3
It was a moral question, ultimately: “Those mentally retarded per-
sons who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility
should be tried and punished when they commit crimes,” Justice Ste-
vens wrote for the majority. “Because of their disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most
serious adult criminal conduct.”4
How to determine the culpability necessary before we put a per-
son to death? Unless they were willing to assert transcendent moral
facts, the Justices could only consult the “evolving standards of decency
of a maturing society.” All agreed that legislatures reflected these
“evolving standards” through their changing penal codes. Counting up
thirty states or so that did not execute the retarded, the Atkins majority
found a consensus against it sufficient to render the punishment cruel
and unusual under the 8th Amendment. By a different method of
counting, thirty states imposed their harshest punishment (death or
life with no parole) with no exemption for the mentally retarded. Jury
verdicts, too, constituted a primary indication of society’s standards, all
Justices agreed. Juries rarely voted for death for the mentally retarded.
But almost never is not never, and the death penalty itself was to be
reserved only for the worst of the worst. United in the belief that public
standards evolve and inform the 8th Amendment, when seeking to as-
sess the temperament more than the temperature of this nation, the
Court continued to split in Atkins over whether public opinion polls,
briefs of religious and professional organizations, and those of Euro-
pean nations should count in determining the consensus necessary to
make death unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment.
Although public opinion does inform the meaning of “cruel and
unusual”, independently of popular sentiment the Court was really de-
ciding the larger moral question of whether those with diminished
mental capacity could be fully evil and deserve to die. Can a killer be
insane and wicked, sick and evil, young and evil, delusional yet respon-
sible enough to die? Andrea Yates, with a history of mental illness,
3. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
4. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2244.
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drowned her five children in a bathtub to send them to heaven. The
jury found her guilty of multiple murder, but spared her life.
In some states, however, judges and not juries decided whether to
condemn a person to die. Three days after it prohibited executing the
mentally retarded in Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona
answered the question they had left hanging in Apprendi. Death was no
exception: All facts that elevated any punishment beyond its statutory
maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.5 On the
other hand death was different: With every other crime, within limits
imposed by the legislature, the judge decided on the sentence. But as
the Court decided, the Constitution required that only a jury could
sentence a convicted murderer to death. Was every capital defendant’s
right to a jury sentence so fundamental that Ring was retroactive? The
question was pressing but left unanswered. If the Constitution flatly
forbade a judge from having the final say of death and that prohibition
were retroactive, then hundreds of the condemned on death rows in
several states would have their death sentences vacated. Among them
in Florida, Danny Rolling, the Gainesville Ninja killer who stalked,
raped, tortured and stabbed to death five undergraduates, posing their
dead bodies pornographically, taking nipples with him in a baggie,
leaving behind a head on a mantel. Ten years later on Florida’s Death
Row at Starke, I stood there watching Rolling in his cell twelve feet
away, tranquil, glasses propped on the bridge of his nose, lying back in
bed, totally engrossed in a good book. I remembered his tortured and
dismembered victims, brutally slaughtered in their young prime, and
the families they left behind. And I seethed, growling from a place
deep inside, “Damn you, why aren’t you dead?”
If Ring were fully retroactive, however, then arguably every person
who had been sentenced to death by a judge, even upon the jury’s
unanimous but non-binding recommendation, would be entitled to a
resentencing. Danny Rolling might well be released from Death Row.
For several years, federal judges in Pennsylvania had individually
overturned the last twenty state death sentences to come before them,
often on hypertechnical grounds. Then New York federal Judge Rakoff
took it a step further by becoming the first federal judge in the U.S. to
announce the entire federal death penalty unconstitutional. Inevitably,
an innocent person would be executed, the judge insisted, and on bal-
ance the death penalty would not save innocent lives. True, two major
5. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
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recent studies (one from Emory, the other from the University of Colo-
rado) had shown that capital punishment did have a significantly
greater deterrent effect. But those studies, already underplayed by a
largely abolitionist press and thus mostly kept from public conscious-
ness, were not even mentioned by Rakoff nor by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Breyer in Ring the week before when he summarily omitted
them from his list, simply insisting that “studies of deterrence are at
most inconclusive.”6 Besides, for abolitionists, no less than for retribu-
tivist advocates of a death penalty as sometimes deserved, deterrence
was not the issue.
Post September 11th, however, abolitionists dared not try to con-
vince the public that no crime was so heinous, no perpetrator so
wicked as to ever deserve execution. Instead, their focus of attack was
process and the real, if remote, possibility of executing a factually inno-
cent person. “Cutting off the opportunity for exoneration,” Judge
Rakoff boldly declared, was “tantamount to foreseeable, state-spon-
sored murder of innocent human beings.”7 Most observers correctly
predicted that the district court’s pseudo-analytic Constitutional usur-
pation to be quickly reversed on appeal, but committed abolitionists
continued to champion the standard “state-sponsored murder” hyper-
bole. Aided by leading media outlets like the New York Times downplay-
ing contrary voices, selectively reporting, relentlessly slanting and
shamelessly spinning death penalty news, the abolitionist bench and
organized bar continued their relentless attack.
Recognizing they had no chance of abolishing it wholesale in the
states, local bar associations followed the A.B.A.’s call for a moratorium
on executions, organizing conferences stacked with death penalty op-
ponents. The City Council of New York was preparing to replace Phila-
delphia as the leading municipality to adopt a resolution calling for a
state and national moratorium, purporting to study it while preparing
to destroy the punishment by staying it. Meanwhile, back in Illinois,
Governor Ryan, about to leave office under a cloud of corruption and
publicly flirting with a wholesale commutation, ordered a review of
every capital sentence, opening a public wound through which the
families of the victims bled, as they were forced to plead again for the
death of the condemned who had murdered and in some cases tor-
tured their loved ones.
6. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2446.
7. United States v. Quinones, 205 F.Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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The first anniversary of September 11 saw the fight against terror
continuing, as the horror and searing pain faded into a settled anger
and deep-seated anguish that terrorists with weapons of mass destruc-
tion might murder millions. Repeatedly warned by their own govern-
ment that more attacks were inevitable, a jittery nation, a generation
unaccustomed to feeling insecure, had entered more fully a post Sep-
tember 11th world. The U.S. was detaining but not indicting ranking Al
Qaeda except for Moussaoui. Bin Laden was dead or safe. With only a
small spike in measured public support for capital punishment, in this
new “normal” state of heightened anxiety and resolve, in spite of the
organized abolitionist drumbeat, under-represented in the media and
the academy, administrations—state and federal—continued to ad-
minister flawed death penalty schemes, marginally improved. Within
weeks after Atkins and Ring, legislatures in Delaware and Colorado met
in special session and amended their death penalty statutes; other af-
fected states prepared to follow suit. The abolitionists pressed on at all
levels, more and more effectively. All that seemed to stand between
them and success was the sentiment of solid majorities of the American
people in most states, and they were steadily chipping away at that
mass.
As the Supreme Court’s 2002 fall term opened, speculation
mounted. The Court had reversed themselves twice within a week—in
Atkins and Ring—restricting both the class of who could deserve to die,
and the process by which the decision was made. Substantively, by sub-
tracting mentally retarded killers, the Court had continued to shrink
the class of death-eligibles: No one insane, or under sixteen at the time
of the crime, or mentally retarded could be put to death. For only the
fourth or fifth time since 1976 and the modern era, the court imposed
substantive limits on what could count as the worst of the worst. Some
of us pitched this to the media as merely a refinement, animated by
the Court’s attempt to reserve the penalty only for the worst of the
worst. Others suggested hopefully or fearfully, it might be a next step
toward outright national abolition.
In any event, the right of a state to execute murderers who killed
before they turned eighteen seemed next up. In August, three Justices
publicly dissented from a denial of certiorari, chastising the majority for
allowing Texas to have condemned a person to death for a murder
committed when he was seventeen.8 It took four votes to grant cert.,
8. Patterson v. Texas, 2002 WL 1986618.
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and when the term opened and the Court made public its list of ques-
tions to be answered, death for juveniles was not among them. For
now, the Court’s latest pronouncement stood: A state may determine
that a seventeen-year-old deserves to die.
Three Justices dissenting where it took four, became four justices
dissenting from a denial of habeas when it took five, again declaring it
“shameful” to put to death a person who killed when less than eigh-
teen.9  They were but one vote shy of finding a national consensus,
buttressed by world public opinion. Momentum was clearly shifting,
and the Court seemed on the brink of constitutionally shrinking the
class of death-eligibles yet again, declaring a national consensus against
executing youthful murderers.
Then the Sniper struck.
From Baltimore to Richmond, as ten innocents were randomly
shot dead from afar, cities were gripped with fear. Once captured, the
older Sniper, a gulf war veteran converted to Islam, stirred hatred and
fear that Al Qaeda could duplicate this form of terror. Federal and
state prosecutors from different jurisdictions competed to try the snip-
ers, but only Virginia, not Maryland or the feds could seek death for
the younger, seventeen-year-old, John Malvo. Virginia could prosecute
both of them capitally, as multiple murderers and for their murders
with the “intent to intimidate the civilian population at large,” its re-
cently enacted aggravator.
September 11th had to influence how we feel about responsibility.
Are Middle Eastern Muslim terrorists mentally ill if their culture se-
duces and coerces them to become martyrs? How about inner-city U.S.
teenagers seduced and coerced to kill by older leaders in their own
drug culture? Or a seventeen-year-old assassin dominated by his older
partner? Suppose the younger had dominated? It happens on the
streets. One thing was clear, now that the issue was squarely and con-
cretely before the American People, the abolitionist claim of a national
consensus against ever executing a seventeen-year-old was instantly
exploded.
September 11th then, does impose its own lens. The case of Rich-
ard Reid—Al Qaeda-trained shoe bomber, who, but for the timely in-
tercession of alert passengers and crew, would have blown up a plane-
full of people—and the “twentieth hijacker”, Moussaoui, forces us to
ask whether the death penalty must be reserved only for those who
9. In re Stanford, 2002 WL 984217.
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have provably caused death. Proponents search for a vocabulary to ex-
plain how the loss of one innocent murder victim could be infinitely
great, yet mass murder be worse. They search for a language accept-
able to the courts, the media, and academic society, in which they
could articulate, and justify acting on their rage.
Post-September 11th, the focus on deterrence fades even faster—
when their own deaths are alluring, suicide bombers (although not
necessarily those who direct them) seem undeterrable. New, more so-
phisticated studies reveal increasingly (but for terrorism), the death
penalty’s greater general deterrent effect. Still the overwhelmingly abo-
litionist media readily cooperate in ignoring deterrence, except for an
occasional barb that the death penalty won’t stop a suicide bomber.
In deciding whether to condemn terrorist murderers to death, we
are forced to reevaluate the Model Penal Code’s standard mitigator:
The killer believed the killing to be morally justified. Is responsibility
diminished by the zealot’s pleasure in going to heaven for destroying
the West? Is evil real? Can one not only act badly, but also be bad and
be executed for it? Can sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds ever deserve to
die? Or do we categorically exempt whole classes—the retarded, the
young, the religious fanatics? Old wine in new bottles.
The U.S.A. today moves toward abolition, or reform. The days of
sleeping or drunk capital defenders are past. Competent, well-funded
counsel, state-funded DNA testing, and other reforms should produce
only factually guilty death-eligibles. But that just moves the question
back to its core: Among the culpable, who deserves to die, and why?
Is death different? As punishment, as harm? Early in 2002, Robert
Courtney, the multimillionaire pharmacist—from greed and with a
most depraved indifference to human life—diluted chemotherapy
treatments to cancer patients, thereby subjecting scores of trusting vic-
tims to certain, lingering, painful suffering and possible death. He was
allowed to plead guilty and was sentenced only to a long prison term.
Retributivist advocates of the death penalty know this was grotesquely
unjust. We have only begun to wrestle with it: “Death is different” must
evolve, as through cloning and gene manipulation, man becomes “an-
other manmade thing”. In 2002, euthanasia was legalized in the
Netherlands: Increasingly we have the right to take our own life, and
the capacity to make, extend, and suspend the lives of others. On the
new horizon, life and death change their meaning.
2003 began with a jolt. At the end of his term, with friends and
associates already under indictment for selling commercial drivers’ li-
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censes to unqualified drivers, one of whom crashed and killed six chil-
dren, while $190,000 of that bribery money went into his campaign for
Governor, mired in scandal and maladministration with a federal in-
vestigation closing in on him, Governor George Ryan found himself
serenaded by the abolitionists who assured the Politician that greatness
could still be achieved (not to mention big bucks on the lecture cir-
cuit). Having forced the victims’ families to publicly air their pain
again, to beg again for the Justice they had long since been assured—
that the killer of their loved one should die—with adulation pouring
in from world leaders, to the adoring cheers of adoring abolitionists,
the Governor emptied Illinois’ death row. Having promised a real case-
by-case review, the Governor instead blanketly commuted all 163 death
sentences.
Above and beyond its cruelty and callousness, it was a morally in-
discriminate act.
Among the returning veterans of death row who would now be
allowed to live in prison, no longer specially condemned, were Fedell
Caffey and Jacqueline Williams. Although she already had three chil-
dren, the couple decided they wanted a baby. So they stabbed to death
Debra Evans in her apartment, cut her fetus from her body, and then
murdered her ten-year-old daughter, Samantha. Next they abducted
then murdered her eight-year-old son, Joshua, beneficently leaving
alive the seventeen-month-old who could not be a witness against
them.
Also among the spared whose return was wildly cheered, Latasha
Pulliam had lured six-year-old Shenosha Richard with a bag of potato
chips and a promise to take her to the movies. Instead she took the
child to her boyfriend and they tortured her: He anally penetrated the
little girl with a shoe polish applicator. Pulliam vaginally assaulted the
child with a hammer. Then they used the same hammer to crush her
skull, beat and strangled her, and dumped her in a garbage can. Pul-
liam had a measured IQ of sixty-nine.
The Executive power does and should include prerogative, the
right to go outside the rules in the special case for the good of the
whole. Executive power includes conscience as a corrective on strict
legal justice, as an instrument of mercy. The power to spare should
only be used collectively and indiscriminately for an entire group for
reasons of state, to quiet serious unrest, or correct serious injustice.
Unquestionably the Governor’s blanket commutation was legally bind-
ing. Much less clear was whether life without parole could be substi-
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tuted for those who had been condemned to die when that penalty did
not yet exist. If not, these killers would have had restored to them not
only their normal lives in prison, but also their hope of eventual
release.
Worst of all and most ironic, the Governor’s morally indiscrimi-
nate blanket pardon directly violated the spirit of the Commission the
Governor himself had established, whose recommendations he had
unsuccessfully urged upon the legislature. In common, the Illinois
Commission, the Constitution Project, the Columbia (Liebman) Study
and we retributivists all insist that the worst of the worst can and should
be distinguished: Not all murderers are alike. The Illinois Commission
had suggested ways to narrow the class of death-eligibles. The Gover-
nor had a golden opportunity to actually apply these criteria, case by
case to ask whether each individual convicted murderer should be
death-eligible. He might have determined that many, perhaps most
condemned killers could be removed from death row justly. He could
have made a giant stride for the death penalty dialogue by making
refined moral distinctions in the name of the Commission he himself
had established. He could have shown how a more morally refined sys-
tem would work in practice. He could have actually reserved the death
penalty for the worst of the worst. Instead, he showed the same blind-
ness shown by so many abolitionists and vengeful advocates: They too
would treat all murderers indiscriminately.
This is a critical moment for the Nation. As angry and hurt as we
are, as disgusted as we retributivist advocates feel toward abolitionists
for their moral insensitivity, more and more common ground reveals
itself. No one who knows it likes the capital punishment regime, as-is.
Capital crimes are too haphazardly defined; capital punishment is too
haphazardly administered. Increasingly we agree that if the death pen-
alty is used at all, it ought to be reserved for the worst of the worst who,
beyond factual and moral doubt, deserve to die.
Who does deserve to die and why? Can legislatures articulate mor-
ally refined categories in advance? Can prosecutors and juries—apply-
ing reason and informed emotion, apply those categories fairly and
consistently? Can abolitionists and advocates stop the rhetoric—con-
testing and striving to best each other in debate—and instead engage
in dialectic, minds cooperatively engaged at getting at the truth?
This is the time. This is the moment that presses us to reconsider
and reform.
